Preface
THE DEMISE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR) and the almost immediate access to its official documents granted to the scholarly community have led to a virtual stampede of historians and political scientists to archives and repositories housing the records of the former East German state. The initial results of this research activity have been highly interesting, if sometimes controversial, as the ideological foundations of the former workers' and peasants' state are increasingly shown to have been built on quicksand and the serious shortcomings of its economic and social structures are brought to light in ever greater detail. One of the most intriguing questions of the history of the GDR, whose ideological raison d'être lay in its very claim to be the standard bearer of antifascism, concerns the way in which the Communist leadership chose to deal with the entire complex of issues involving Germany's Nazi past, Israel, the Jews, and anti-Semitism.
Michael Wolffsohn explored certain international aspects of this theme in the Institute's first Alois Mertes Memorial Lecture in 1991. In the fourth lecture in this series, Jeffrey Herf illustrates the nature of this contradictory relationship by analyzing the case of Paul Merker, an East German Communist leader who paid with imprisonment and the destruction of his political career for his pro Jewish sentiments, his support of Wiedergutmachung, and his sympathies for the state of Israel in the 1950s. As Herf points out, the Merker case clearly shows how the self-proclaimed antifascist regime of the GDR did and did not directly face the Nazi past. In contrast to the Slansky trial, for example, the Merker case made no headlines and was nobody's cause célèbre, but it belongs to those "lost causes" and "silenced voices" whose history can only now be written.
Jeffrey Herf is a member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, for 1994-95 Osteuropa 1948 -1954 (Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag, 1988 ; Jeffrey Herf, "Dokumentation. Antisemitismus in der SED: Geheime Dokumente zum Fall Paul Merker aus SED-und WS-Archiven," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4 (1994): 635-67; id., "Der Geheimprozeß," Die Zeit, October 7, 1994; Wolfgang Kießling, Partner im -Narrenparadies‖. Der Freundkreis um Noel Field und Paul Merker (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994 German national question. He did so in part to insure that the latter "never again falls into the hands of brown or red totalitarianism."
6 He rejected the application of double standards in regard to dictatorships and human rights violations. Had he been Paul Merker's contemporary, I can well imagine that they might have met on the common terrain of the anti-Nazi resistance. His long-standing and genuine efforts on behalf of close West German-Israeli relations and his attempts to improve the dialogue between Jews in Germany and the United States are all a matter of public record. His premature death in 1985 deprived German politics and society of a badly needed senior, moderate conservative voice in support of a multi-ethnic as well as a unified and democratic Germany.
So perhaps it is not so strange after all that a lecture named after a Catholic, conservative politician should recall the persecution of a most secular German Communist from Berlin. Mertes and Merker would have disagreed about almost every aspect of German politics-but not about the Jewish question. Hence, it is fitting that an Alois Mertes Memorial Lecture examine an important event in the history of the Jewish question in East Germany. In so doing, I seek to extend our understanding of those traditions of German anti-Nazism and antifascism that were repressed by representatives of the official antifascism of the East German regime and left out of the antitotalitarian consensus in West Germany. In view of the continuing violence in Germany in recent years directed against people who, for the most part, should long ago have been called "citizens" rather than "foreigners," it is especially important that we recall those German political traditions that point toward a multi-ethnic democracy.
I can restate this plea in neo-historicist language of the German historian Thomas Nipperdey, who emphasized that German unification must not mean the suppression of the multiple continuities and lost causes of German history in the name of a homogeneous nation and Volk.
7 Rather, it offers the opportunity to examine those traditions and aspects of German history that faded from view during the Cold War and that historians are now able and impelled to examine. One of those continuities was the German anti-Nazi resistance composed of the dissident Communists who fell afoul of Hitler, Stalin, and their own orthodox German comrades and who fought as fiercely against antiSemitism and for a multi-ethnic Germany as they did against German capitalism. Paul Merker was the leading figure of this tradition.
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After the November pogrom of 1938, and especially after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the German Communist response to the Jewish question divided into two variants. The dominant current found expression in Moscow in the wartime speeches, radio addresses, and essays of Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Neck, the leading figures of the German Communist emigration in Moscow.
9 While the Nazis attacked "Jewish Bolshevism," the German Communists in Moscow reduced their public identification with the great outsider of the German nation, the Jews.
10 Ulbricht and Pieck focused on the suffering and later the triumph of the Soviet Union, as well as on their-bitterly disappointed-hopes for an indigenous German revolt to overthrow the Nazis. There were Jewish Communists in Moscow who recognized the connection between anti-Semitism and National Socialist anti-Communism and who spoke out clearly about the Holocaust. However, the Jewish catastrophe did not figure prominently in statements of the German Communist emigration in the Moscow group's first "Appeal" to the Germans published in Berlin in June 1945 or in Walter Ulbricht's main postwar text concerning Nazism, Die Legende vom Deutschen Sozialismus (The Legend of German Socialism).
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German Communism included a second minority tradition in which the Jewish question moved from the periphery to the center of the struggle against Nazism. It found its fullest expression in the German Communist emigration in wartime Mexico City, and Paul Merker (1894 Merker ( -1969 In Mexico City, Merker was the only member of the KPD Politburo.
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From the fall of 1942 to December 1945, he contributed regularly to Freies Deutschland the bi-weekly journal of the German Communists in Mexico City, assumed responsibility for its general political line, and kept up an extensive correspondence with such leading figures of the German anti-Nazi emigration as Ernst Bloch, Thomas Mann, and, above all, Heinrich Mann. In sharp contrast to the writings of the Moscow group, Merker's publications on Nazism and World War II placed anti-Semitism and the Jewish catastrophe at the center of the antifascist struggle. The timing of the evolution of his views suggests that the impact of his stays in the United States, France, and Mexico, as well as the effects of the spirit of the wartime anti-Hitler coalition, contributed to a greater understanding of the Jewish question and to a greater willingness to work with non-Communist refugees.
Paul Merker was not Jewish. However, he was appalled by German antiSemitism and understood and appreciated the contributions of Jews to German history, including their contributions to the socialist and Communist tradition. While in New York and Chicago, he met and worked with Jewish Communists, whose support for equality for American blacks and opposition to white racism within the American working class left a lasting impression on him. While in the Communist underground in Berlin in 1934, he was hidden by Jews who made their homes and apartments available to "illegal comrades." From the pogrom in 1938, he concluded that "the struggle of the German working class against anti-Semitism had been inadequate" and that it was "the special duty of non-Jewish people to decisively stand up against anti-Semitism." 13 Soon after arriving in Mexico City, he published "Hitler's Anti-Semitism and Us" in Freies Deutschland in October 1942. He wrote that, "if all of the German rivers flowed with ink and all the German forests were made of quill pens, they would not suffice to describe the immeasurable crimes which Hitler fascism has commit-ted against the Jewish people." 14 He stressed the commonality of the interests of Jews and Communists, supported restitution for the Jewish survivors, and expressed understanding for the growth of Jewish national feeling and the desire for a Jewish state. He envisaged a postwar Germany with a restored Jewish community. He supported practical financial assistance to help bring about this result. He also pointed to differences between the persecution of Jews and that of Communists: The former were persecuted because of who they were and thus had the same right as did "all of the nations Hitler invaded and oppressed." The latter were persecuted because of what they believed and did. They had voluntarily taken up the struggle against the Nazis and thus could not "expect material compensation for the sacrifices that result." Victory over Nazism was their compensation. Both in Mexico City during the war and in postwar East Berlin, these arguments met with considerable inner-party opposition.
In addition to his articles in Freies Deutschland in 1944 Merker published Deutschland-Sein oder Nichtsein, a two-volume study of close to a thousand pages on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the nature of Nazi Germany. 15 Originally published by a press associated with the Bewegung Freies Deutschland (Movement for a Free Germany), the work, though highly praised by Heinrich Mann, Thomas Mann, Ernst Bloch, and other intellectual and political figures of the German emigration, remained little known. The SED regime prevented it from being published in the GDR, and it did not play a significant role in the "fascism discussion" of the West German New Left in the 1960s. However, it is a stimulating work and one that bears comparison with another major study on Nazism published by a German left-leaning émigré in 1944, Franz Neumann's Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. 16 More so than Neumann, Merker stressed the autonomous dynamic of Nazi racial ideology and its contribution to the unfolding Jewish catastrophe. One can take issue with Merker's conventional Communist arguments about the links between capitalism and fascism and his attacks on Weimar Social Democrats, yet still recognize the work to be an important contemporary analysis of the Nazi regime. Though Merker's enemies within the party accused him of criticizing the Hitler-Stalin Pact, he vehemently disputed these accusations and, on numerous occasions, repeated his solidarity with the Soviet Union. Indeed, in Mexico City, he favorably contrasted the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union to that in the Russian Empire. He never published an essay critical of the Soviet Union, and he worked in a German-Soviet friendship society after his release from prison in 1956. The tone of his published work and his choice of friends during World War II convey the spirit of the antiHitler coalition and suggest a Communist able and willing to work with nonCommunists. He never saw Communism as a god that failed. Indeed, his orthodoxy in regard to the leading role of the Communist Party made his dissent on the Jewish question all the more striking.
In 1946, before he returned to Berlin, Merker was elected to be a member of the Central Committee of the SED when it was founded in 1946. In the SED's office of labor and social welfare in East Berlin from 1946 to 1948, he worked with Leo Zuckermann, who was Jewish, a lawyer, a member of the Freies Deutschland group in Mexico City, as well as of the KPD and the SED, and a future chief assistant to East German President Wilhelm Pieck. Merker again argued in favor of financial restitution for all of the GermanJewish survivors and urged members of the occupation government to combat anti-Semitism in the Soviet zone. In bitter political and bureaucratic disputes within the emergent Communist governing apparatus, Merker argued for placing the claims of the Jewish victims on the same-elevatedmoral and political level as those of former Communist "antifascist resistance fighters. 17 In the summer of 1948, Merker published "Der Krieg in Palästina" (The War in Palastine), in which he expressed his enduring solidarity with the Jews. He supported the creation of the state of Israel, praised the Jewish struggle against British imperialism, American oil interests, and "reactionary interests" of Arab princes and feudal strata, and appealed for close relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the "new democracies" of Eastern Europe.
18 For Merker, "Der Krieg in Palästina" turned out to be a most untimely essay.
Merker In 1948 and 1949, Soviet foreign and domestic policy took a decidedly anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish turn away from support for these former "victims of fascism" toward an extensive and anti-Semitic assault on "cosmopolitanism" at home and Zionism abroad. Now the Mexikaner, that is, the German Communists who fled to Mexico City, fell under suspicion of being "cosmopolitans" and hence Western spies and agents. The attack on Paul Merker and others he knew in the French and Mexican emigration took place in this context. Within the SED, the key institution charged with purging the party of "spies and saboteurs" and "corrupt elements" was the ZPKK. Its key figure, the grand inquisitor of the SED, was its chairman, Hermann Matern. Paul Merker's political career as a leading figure of German Communism ended in August 1950, when he was expelled from the Central Committee and the SED due to espionage accusations stemming from his wartime contact with Noel H. Field. His expulsion was announced in a public resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Party Control Commission.
19 Though the denunciation of Merker in connection with the Field affair contained no explicitly anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish rhetoric, with the exception of Merker, all of the accused were Jewish. All had been in emigration in the West. Yet, if the Merker case had ended there, it would have remained only another of the espionage cases, like the Hiss and Rosenberg cases, linked to the rapid reversal of alliances and loyalties entailed in the shift from the anti-Hitler coalition to the Cold War. Or, given Merker's two years in the United States, six years in France, and four years in Mexico, it would have been another example of the suspicion and paranoia that greeted so many Communists who had fled to the West during the Nazi era.
Merker's denunciation in connection with Field, however, was only the beginning of his difficulties. His fate was sealed by the outcome of the show trial against Rudolf Slansky and other high-ranking Communist-mostly Jewish-defendants in Prague in November 1952. On December 3, 1952, four days after Stasi agents had arrested Merker in Berlin, Rudolf Slansky (the second most powerful figure in the Czech Communist Party and government), Otto Fischl (the former Czech ambassador to East Germany), and Merker's friend Otto Katz (André Simone) were among the eleven mostly Jewish defendants to be executed in Prague by hanging. In the trial, confessions of extremely dubious origins from the accused included accusations that Merker was linked to Slansky, Simone, and Fischl in an international conspiracy to destroy Communism in Eastern and Central Europe.
On December 20, 1952, with the publication of "Lehren aus dem Prozeß gegen das Verschwörerzentrum Slansky" (Lessons of the Trial against the Slansky Conspiracy Center), the Communist Party leaders in East Germany struck the decisive blow against Merker. The author of the statement, Hermann Matern, denounced the "criminal activities of the Zionist organizations." According to Matern, the Slansky trial had clearly shown that "American imperialism organized and implemented its various espionage activities in the peoples' democracies with the state of Israel and with the help of Zionist organizations." Merker, Matern continued, had been shown to be the German branch of this international conspiracy. Zionism had "nothing in common with the goals of humanity." It was a tool of "U.S. imperialism and exclusively served its interests and the interests of Jewish capitalists."
Matern's denunciation rested on an old anti-Semitic stereotype, namely, the pejorative connection between the Jews and capitalism. In Mexico, Matern argued, Merker had defended "the interests of Zionist monopoly capitalists." Merker was a "subject of the U.S. financial oligarchy who called for compensation for Jewish property in order to facilitate the penetration of U.S. finance capital into [postwar] Germany. This is the real basis of his [Merker's] Zionism." Merker's support for Wiedergutmachung concerned, "above all … wealthy Jewish economic emigrants." With such arguments, Matern retrospectively reinterpreted the wartime cooperation and solidarity between some German Communists in the Western emigration, on the one hand, and German Jewish emigrants, American Jewish and non-Jewish Communists, leftists, and liberals, on the other hand, into an enormous and powerful international conspiracy of American imperialists and Jewish capitalists. "Lehren aus dem Prozeß gegen das Verschwörerzentrum Slanski" presented the good old international Jewish conspiracy, this time in a Communist discourse. In Matern's statement, the Jews ceased to be "victims of fascism" and once again became the active perpetrators of a powerful international and anti-German conspiracy. Once again, a German government attacked the Jews for being cosmopolitans rather than true members of the nation. And, only seven years after the destruction of European Jewry, Matern described this conspiracy as small in numbers but extremely powerful and a major threat to the Communist states and parties. As the German political sociologist and historian Sigrid Meuschel has pointed out, German nationalism, this time of a Communist variant, once again defined itself in opposition to a Western, capitalist, international, liberal, Jewish conspiracy.
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Matern also turned Merker's praise of the voluntary engagement and courage of Communist antifascists upside down in a contemptuous effort to say that their "sacrifice and suffering counts for nothing compared to the sacrifices and the suffering of the Jewish people." But it was Matern, not Merker, who turned the memory of the past into a zero-sum game in which recognition of the Jewish tragedy had to come at the price of nonrecognition of Communist antifascist activities or the suffering of others. He imputed to Merker disdain and contempt for the suffering of the Communists that is nowhere to be found in anything Merker wrote or said.
The , and a participant in the Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (Association of Those Persecuted by the Nazi Regime), and Leo Löwenkopf, the chairman of the organized Jewish community in Dresden, did likewise. The arrest of Merker, followed by the flight of Zuckermann, Löwenkopf, and Meyer, meant the elimination from the political scene of the leading advocates for Jewish interests within the East German Communist Party and government. The entry or, as the case may be, re-entry ticket into the East German political elite for those Jews who remained, or recovered prominent positions, in the SED, such as Albert Norden and, after a while, Alexander Abusch, entailed saying little or nothing publicly about the murder of European Jewry. It also meant accepting without protest the diplomatic attack of the Soviet bloc on Israel and focusing antifascist energies on attacking developments in West Germany. As of December 1952-January 1953, it was clear that the silence concerning the Jewish question in East Germany was no longer primarily a result of the inadequacies of Marxist-Leninist theories of fascism and antifascism. By then, East German Communists, Jews and non-Jews, understood that sympathy for the Jews as expressed by Merker was not only "incorrect"; it was dangerous.
Merker was imprisoned in East Berlin from December 1952 to January 1956. During that time, he was interrogated by agents of the Stasi and the Soviet NKVD. Merker's Stasi file comprises over a thousand typed and handwritten pages. 24 He was repeatedly asked 24 For the Merker file, see Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, if he "was a member of Jewish-Zionist organizations. 25 According to the conversations between Merker and his cellmate, who was a Stasi informant, during the early months of his imprisonment in the winter and spring of 1953, the NKVD and Stasi agents had threatened Merker with death and also threatened his family. They told him that his article "Antisemitism and Us," written in 1942, showed that he was a Judenknecht, a "servant of the Jews." They ridiculed him as "the king of the Jews," as one who "had been bought by the Jews" and whose intention was to "sell the GDR off to the Jews."
26
Again and again, they probed his contact with and assistance from Jews, both Communists and non-Communists, during the French and Mexican emigration for further evidence of his participation in an espionage conspiracy.
Following Stalin's death in 1953, with Lavrentry Beria close to the pinnacle of power in Moscow, the attack on Jewish Communists and their non-Jewish Communist friends continued. In 1954 in Budapest, Noel and Herta Field were cleared of the charges of spying for the United States. But Merker was not released from prison. Merker believed that the NKVD and Stasi were preparing a spectacular public show trial in Berlin in which he would be denounced as the German Slansky. Instead, he was tried in East Germany's Supreme Court, the Oberste Gericht. Merker refused to confess to participation in an espionage conspiracy. In addition to the presence of an uncooperative defendant, perhaps Merker's trial remained secret because Walter Ulbricht and the East German leadership understood how bizarre it would appear for an "antifascist" German government to be convicting a veteran Communist for espionage as a result of his sympathies for the Jews. The trial remained a secret until the collapse of the GDR in 1989 and the opening of access to the archives of the Oberste Gericht, which had been transferred to the Stasi archives. On March 30, 1955, the judges of the East German Supreme Court sentenced Merker to 25 See "Vernehmungsprotokoll des Häftlings, Merker, Paul Friedrich" (March 3, 1953) , BStU, MfS, Archiv Nr. 192/56, Untersuchungsvorgang Nr. 294/52 Paul Merker, Band II, 000122. 26 Merker, "An die Zentrale Kontrollkommission des ZK der SED," 1.
eight years in prison. 27 Merker and his wife, Margaret Menzel-Merker, who were both loyal Communists, insisted that his entire prosecution was a violation of Marxist-Leninist principles. They never tried to flee to the West, to publicize the case within or outside East Germany, or to offer any evidence of disillusionment with the Party or the regime. The Merker case was no one's cause célèbre during the Cold War.
The court's verdict closely followed the political indictment that Matern had voiced in December 1952. Pointing to the Slansky trial, the judges convicted Merker of helping the imperialists try to destroy socialism from within by means of corrupting leading figures of the Communist parties. The court transformed Merker's political judgments during his years in France (1936 France ( -1942 and Mexico (1942 Mexico ( -1946 into criminal acts. It accused Merker of contacts with a variety of suspicious organizations and individuals: the socalled Jewish aid organization, the Antifascist Refugee Committee in New York, which had helped him to escape from France; anti-Nazi Gaullists who had also helped Merker leave France; Otto Katz, who had been convicted in the Slansky trial as an "international spy, Zionist, and Trotskyist"; the socalled emigrant Jewish capitalists in Mexico City, and the now excommunicated American Communist leader, Earl Browder, someone who, the court declared, had "decisively weakened the struggle of peoples against fascism."
The court took as evidence to support these charges Merker's abovementioned essays in Freies Deutschland. His arguments for restitution to Jewish survivors became a demand for "compensation of all Jewish capitalists." Like Matern, the judges of the Oberste Gericht attacked his attempt to distinguish between the persecution of Jews and Communists. The court explained Merker's engagement on behalf of the Jewish people as a result of the corrupting influence of "emigrant Jewish capitalists" and his "continuous contact with 27 The records of the political trials in the East German Oberste Gericht were placed in the Stasi files. For the court's judgment in Merker's case, see "Oberstes Gericht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik I. Strafsenat I Zst. (1) 1/55. Im Namen des Volkes in der Strafsache gegen den Kellner Paul Merker" (March 29-30, 1955), BStU, Archiv Nr. 192/56, MfS, Untersuchungsvorgang Nr. 294/52, Paul Merker, Band III, 000138-000152 . The verdict, along with two statements by Merker, appear in Herf, "Dokumentation. Antisemitismus in der SED." Zionist circles, especially the organization of the World Jewish Congress," and "emigrant capitalistic Jewish circles." In Mexico, according to the Supreme Court judgment, Merker's base in the emigration did not lie on "the political but rather on the racial emigration," especially "emigrant, capitalist, Jewish circles." In Merker's support for compensation for all Jews who emigrated from Germany, recognizing the right of returning Jews to be regarded as a national minority, and the creation of a Jewish state, the court saw further proof of Merker's involvement in an international, antiCommunist espionage conspiracy. Thus, the verdict explained-and discredited-Merker's efforts to place the Jewish catastrophe at the center of Communist, antifascist politics as the result of his corruption by Jewish capitalists and clever intelligence services, to whom he was indebted. In placing the link among Jews, capitalism, and financial corruption at its core, the verdict stands alongside the ZPKK denunciation of December 1952 as an important document of postwar East German anti-Semitism.
Ten months later, on January 27, 1956, shortly before Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" and a period of de-Stalinization, Merker was released from prison. In April and May 1956, the ZPKK concluded that espionage accusations against Merker stemming from the Slansky trial "were insufficiently proven," that the guilty verdict was to be rescinded, and that Merker was to be declared innocent and thus "rehabilitated."
28 In July 1956, Ulbricht wrote elliptically to Merker that "the reexamination undertaken under new points of view led to the conclusion that the accusations made against you in the most important matters were of a political nature and do not justify judicial prosecution." 29 Yet Merker's request for a full political rehabilitation and return to a leading position in the party and government was unsuccessful. In July 1956, in the same Supreme Court that had convicted him, the same judges and prosecutor-who again met in secret session-followed the Central Committee directives and reversed the Supreme Court verdict of March 30, 1955, and declared Merker innocent. 30 Though Merker was released from prison, Ulbricht's letter had made it clear that his views remained politically incorrect.
The SED archives reveal further evidence that the political reasons for Merker's downfall were centered on the Jewish question. Upon his release, and in response to his efforts at full political rehabilitation, the Central Party Control Commission asked Merker to write a statement responding to the accusations made by Matern and the Central Committee against him in December 1952. On June 1, 1956, Merker submitted a remarkable thirtyeight-page statement on his position on the Jewish question. 31 He wrote that his Soviet and German interrogators were convinced that he must have been an agent for the United States, Israel, or perhaps Zionist organizations, because he had taken such a strong position on the Jewish question during World War II. They found no evidence that he was Jewish. Why, they reasoned, would any non-Jewish German Communist pay so much attention to the Jewish question unless he was an agent of American imperialists or Zionists and Jewish capitalists? Merker responded as follows:
I am neither a Jew nor a Zionist, though, certainly, it would be no crime to be either. I have never had the intent to flee to Palestine. I have not supported the efforts of Zionism. I have ... occasionally said that, after having been plundered by Hitler fascism, most deeply humiliated, driven from the homelands, and millions of them murdered, only because they were Jews, the feeling of a deepest bond and the desire for their own Jewish country emerged among Jews of different countries. This feeling was the expression of those most deeply harmed and outraged. Moreover: Hitler fascism emerged among us. We [Germans] did not succeed through the actions of the working masses in preventing the erection of its rule and hence the commission of its crimes. Therefore, especially we Germans must not and ought not ignore or fight against what I call this strengthening of Jewish national feeling.
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It was, he continued, -historically inaccurate‖ to describe Zionism as an agent of American imperialism. On the contrary, it was -the masses of Jews‖ in many countries, with support from the Soviet Union and in opposition to -English and American imperialism,‖ who had helped to bring the state of Israel into existence. In conclusion, the suppression of a minority tradition of German Communism as articulated by Merker offers a partial answer to the riddle of how a government whose central legitimation lay in its antifascism could pursue policies that entailed support for more violence against the Jews living in Israel. In the next four decades, de-Stalinization, thaws, and Ostpolitik did little to moderate the impact of Merker's downfall, imprisonment, and partial rehabilitation. The Jewish catastrophe never found a central place in the history and memory of East German antifascism. The East German regime did not offer Wiedergutmachung payments specifically to survivors of the Holocaust. The government and society lived by the belief that, because fascism had everything to do with capitalism, which the Communists had abolished after the war, there was no additional need for a specifically Communist attempt to come to terms with the aspects of the Nazi regime that could not be derived from capitalist economics. After 1952-1953, there was no more protest or inner-party strife over East Germany's growing antagonism toward Israel. Beginning in the mid-and late 1950s, and continuing until 1989, the East German government developed close ties to the most radical and militant of Israel's Arab enemies: from Nasser's Egypt, to the PLO, to Iraq and Syria. East Germany voted for every anti-Israel resolution in the United Nations, including the resolution equating Zionism with racism. Its long-standing diplomatic support for the PLO in the years of greatest terrorism is a matter of public record. There is a dream-world quality to many documents of East German history. It is as if, to paraphrase Max Horkheimer's famous dictum concerning fascism and capitalism, those in East Germany who wanted to talk about fascism should only talk about capitalism. In the political discourse of East German Communism, talking about the Holocaust or antiSemitism aroused suspicion of sympathies for that vast and powerful conspiracy of Zionists, American imperialists, and Jewish cosmopolitans. Hence, the Jewish catastrophe remained a peripheral event in the dominant discourse of East German antifascist remembrance. Paul Merker's political blunder was to lend support and empathy to the Jews when the Communists were seeking to present themselves as the genuine representatives of a unified German nation and after Moscow had launched a campaign against "cosmopolitans." As a veteran Communist, Merker understood how dangerous his untimely views on the Jewish question were. Nevertheless, he refused to adapt to postwar East German Communist nationalism or to break with his deeply felt solidarity with the Jews. The Merker case concerns a good and courageous man, just as much as the dangerous mixture of amnesia, broken solidarity, nationalism, and anti-Semitic prejudices that entered into the ideology and practice of the East German government's official antifascism. In the early years of the GDR, it was not sufficient to suppress all non-Communist political currents. The East German dictatorship also rested on the destruction of dissenting Communist memories of past solidarity with the Jews and ongoing support for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Paul Merker was old and experienced enough to be able to remind his comrades that, at one time, solidarity with the Jews had something to do with the fight against Nazi Germany. He paid for this bit of untimely impudence with prison and the destruction of his political career. Merker's enduring solidarity with the Jews was incompatible with the dialectic of militant and even forgetful optimism that defined official East German antifascism, and with the subsequent evolution of that regime into an adversary of Israel. Historians need to present a balanced and critical account of politics and memory in both East and West Germany. The frequently and rightly discussed shortcomings of coming to terms with the past in West Germany should not deflect critical examination of how the self-proclaimed antifascist East German regime did and did not directly face the Nazi past.
There is a photo of Walter Ulbricht that shows him in 1961 leading the SED party elites out of the memorial to the victims of fascism at the former Nazi concentration camp in Sachsenhausen. Behind him is the smokestack of the concentration camp and a crowd of people attending the opening ceremonies of the memorial. He is flanked by East German soldiers and is waving the politician's wave of victory. The photo could be entitled "Communism rises like a phoenix from the ashes of defeat." Now that the German Democratic Republic itself is gone, the opening of archives that were meant to be closed for many decades makes it possible to write the history of the lost causes and silenced voices that were absent and forgotten in that photo of a smiling Walter Ulbricht in Sachsenhausen in 1961.
